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The title of this paper is self evident. According to the Rt Hon. Geoffrey Palmer, Minister of 
Justice, (as he was) "the selective process is entirely a matter of accepted informal tradition" .1 If 
that acceptance be the test of suitability, the inquiry ends forthwith. However, the substance of 
Palmer's exposition is fraught with difficulties. The Minister writes:2 
It is a process which the public has little or no understanding. But there is little public criticism of 
the mechanics of the selection process either. 
With respect, the statements pose quite difficult problems. How can the public criticise that of 
which they have little or no understanding? Further, the Minister tacitly assumes silence 
amounts to acceptance. Moreover, the statements point to a much larger and more significant 
constitutional issue. That is, given the powers of judges, both statutory and inherent , and the 
prevalence of their decisions in the ordinary course of activities, why are their appointments 
shrouded in mystery? The corollary of that concern is whether there is some mystery which ought , 
in the public interest, to be continued. 
It remains therefore, for an overt admission that the aim of this paper is to provide a platform for 
informal discussion , both within and beyond legal circles, on the selection process in New Zealand. 
The writer's particular concern is on the potential danger of "political" appointments. The writer 
submits an appointment is political when the appointee is selected for his partisan political 
sympathies. As such , the writer discusses why the govrenment of the day may want to make such an 
appointment. Further, how and by what means such an intention could be effected. Later the paper 
analyses the selection difficulties experienced in overseas jurisdictions. The paper also provides a 
possible reform measure. 
We begin our examination by analysing the mechanics of our informal tradition . 
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Who is eligible? 
It appears the statutory provisions do no more than assert threshold standings:3 
No person shall be appointed a Judge unless he has held a practising certificate as a barrister or 
solicitor for at least 7 years. 
The Judicature Act makes provision for thirty one High Court Judges and a Chief Justice.4 Whereas 
the District Couts Act provides for ninety eight District Court Judges and a Chief District Court 
Judge.5 
Other necessary pre-requisites are determined by the recommender. At the District Court level, 
former Chief District Court Judge Peter Trapski looked for:6 
-Someone who could move a high volume of work; 
-Geographically, many District Court Judges worked together, so it was important 
to appoint a person who could work as part of a team; 
-Prospects wih good communication skills: 
-Prospects willing to make sacrifices and who showed commitment to their work. 
For the High Court and Court of Appeal, former Chief Justice Sir Ronald Davison considered:? 
-The prospect's age. Around 50 was the optimum time period; 
-Extent and experience at the bar, particularly in the criminal field. 
-Work rate. Given time constraints, it is important to furnish a decision within a 
reasonable time; 
-Most importantly, the prospect had to exhibit good judgment. This aspect was 
determined by the way a prospect presented the relevant issues of a case 
Chief Judge Trapski and Sir Ronald held dossiers on prospective judges. Judge Trapski's 
compilation contained around one hundred and fifty potentials. Without further research, the high 
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number suggests there are many capable candidates. 
At the Court of Appeal level, the President of that Court is always consulted.a The present 
incumbent Sir Robin Cooke commented on the need to appoint people with a bi-cultural approach . In 
his Honour's opinion, multi-cultural problems are among the greatest this country has to face. 
A candidate's intellectual capacity is another primary requirement. Other eligibility factors can be 
elicited from disqualification considerations. 9 These include past or present problems with Trust 
funds and marital status. A person whos marriage has been dissolved is not barred from the bench . 
Rather, a person who has not reached a proper resolution to the dissolution proceedings, and who 
takes up with another, will be precluded. 
The Decision Makers 
A High Court Judge is appointed by the Governor General in the name and on behalf of Her Majesty. 
1 O A District Court Judge is appointed by the Governor General by warrant under his hand. 11 
Whether the Governor General appoints on behalf of Her Majesty or by warrant is of little practical 
signficance. Rather, a District Court appointment by warrant indicates the statutory origins of 
that Court.12 Further, as Ellis QC (as he was) avers, Her Majesty is able to appoint a District 
Court Judge under the Royal Powers Act 1953.13 
The statutory provisions highlight the only formal phase of the process. It is thus a matter of 
convention that judges at either level are in fact chosen by the Attorney-General. The Attorney has 
the final decision upon recommendations received from the Chief Justice for High Court and Court of 
Appeal , and Chief District Court Judge for District Court aappointments. 
The mechanics appear to be straightforward.14 The Chief Judges, from their dossiers, consult 
other members of the bench. Three names are thereafter tendered for the Attorney's consideration 
and final decision. Discussions between the Attorney and respective Chief Judge, is followed with 
consultation initiated by the Solicitor-General on behalf of the Attorney. The Solicitor-General may 
seek the opinions of members of the bar, Law Society , Secretary for Justice or other persons wih 
relevant information.15 
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In comparison to the statutory pronouncements, the consultative process is informal. Its usefulness 
relies heavily on those holding the key positions. Obviously that state of affairs can be attacked on 
different grounds. The first, and most striking is the lack of consistency in judicial appointments 
more generally. It is a matter of practice that consultations are at all relevant in the appointment 
of judges to the District, High and Court of Appeal benches. In contrast the Minster of Social 
Welfare must consult the Minster of Justice before an appointment to the Social Security Appeal 
Authority; 16 the Minister of Justice must consult the Minster of Housing before a Residential 
Tenancies Tribunal appointment.1 7 The begging question is whether formalised consultations will 
add anything to the quality of the final appoinment. That question will be analysed later in the paper. 
A second ground of discourse is to question whether we can put our trust in the informal process. It 
must satisfy the task of collating and giving due weight the complex array of factors that need to be 
considered in making a judicial appointment. As Professor Shetreet puts it: 18 
The quality of the judges in any system largely depends upon the method of their 
appointment and the standards applied by the appointing authorities in the process of 
the selection of judges. 
Further, as Geoffrey Palmer agrees, Lord Gardiner asserts: 19 
However good the law is , if a judge is appointed who ought not to have been made a 
judge, then everything is wrong. 
The writer has already briefly adverted to the mechanics of our selection process. The following 
analysis provides more substantive information on how the final decisioin is arrived at. 
The selection assumption is premised on the limited perception that one candidate stands alone as the 
obvious choice. However, the reality is somewhat less effusive. Sir Ronald Davison commented 
that in his time as Chief Justice, of the thirty appointments he had been part, three of his first 
choices for judgeships were flatly refused as unacceptable. In one of the three rejections, he was 
not told why the candidate had been passed over, nor if rejection was due to the candidate not being of 
the required caibre. For the other two, the candidates were of the necessary standard, but rejected 
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for other reasons which made their suitability questionable. Again he was not privy to Attorney 
Generals reasons. Sir Ronald contended that those rejections aside, his first choice would not as a 
matter of course be accepted. Instead, one of the three, ranked in merit, would be accepted and 
appointed. 
From this practice, there arise these considerations. First, the selection is from a range of 
candidates proposed by the Chief Justice. Second, there are disparate views as to the proposed and 
final appointments. The views may in themselves be safety checks on any purported abuse by the 
Chief Justice. The stare decesis of rejection , provides two further considerations. It is not beyond 
the realms of possibility for the Attorney to reject all three aspirants. Hence it is possibly a little 
misleading to aver that the Attorney is limited to three choices. Further, and more importantly, the 
rejection precedence is tacit support for the proposition that in the final analysis, the Attorney has 
appointed the person wants, for whatever reason. 
As a statistical analogy, the three first choice rejections, out of thirty appointments is a ten percent 
failure rate that the writer finds unacceptable . That percentage rate is probably too low, given Sir 
Ronald's contention of his first choice not always being accepted. The writer submits the true 
percentage rate could not be worked out, without a quite onerous undertaking by Sir Ronald to review 
his confidential documents. To that end, the writer did not want to push his luck. Irrespective of that 
true figure, the writer can still justify his discontent, with the available information. As shown it is 
the Chief Justice who evaluates the potential candidates, and by custom tenders the three people he 
considers most appropriate. It is therefore a consideration which is not undertaken lightly, 
particularly since he must rank his selections in order of preference. Moreover, the writer 
submits, the Chief Justice in his positions of judge and administrator, is more acutely aware of 
judicial temperament and hence more able to objectify a candidate's skills. 
To conclude this section, the writer submits the current process of decision making raises the 
concern of who is best able to judge a potential candidate. The informality of the process detracts 
from our confidence in the selection system. It rather, impedes constructive criticisms . 
How does one "get noticed"? 
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As a caveat to the following discussion, it must be noted that a judgeship is no longer solely regarded 
as an accolade. 20 Rather, it is now more often perceived as a career opportunity. Accordingly 
there is enormous difficulty in persuading the 'final choice' to take up the appointment. Perhaps as 
Sir Ronald points out, the difficulty lies with the economics of an appointment. A leading candidate 
may well have to take a substantial drop in income. However, the new superannuation package21 
may equalise any such loss, thereby enhancing the viability of accepting an appointment. 
The writer when trying to ascertain how candidates came to the notice of the Chief Judges, received 
varied and contradictory information. The information was gained from those who supposedly were 
informed as to the selection procedures. That the information was contradictory underlines how 
shrouded in mystery the process really is. Tis poor that the public have no or little understanding of 
the process, but for the players in the system to also be relatively ignorant is appalling . The writer 
threrupon interviewed the former Chief Judges to get definitive statements . 
One does not apply for a High Court judgeship. Therefore , you can only really draw 
attention to yourself in the courts. Sir Ronald 's dossier was compiled according to 
the experiences of all High Court Judges.22 
Candidates for District Court judgeships also come to the fore in the courts. Further, 
one can apply to be a District Court Judge. The direct method involves an approach to 
the Chief District Court Judge, Secretary for Justice, or President of the District 
Law Society or National Law Society. The direct mode of notice existed prior to 
Geoffrey Palmer's Wairakei initiative . The Minister during a District Court Judges 
conference outlined proposals to "open up the process by which judges are selected or 
appointed" . 23 One proposal was to invite/ practitioners to make approaches, for four 
District Court Judgeships, to the Chief District Court Judge, Solicitor General or 
Secretary for Justice. The value of the Minister's proposal must therefore be seen as 
consolidating the direct, but hitherto informal practice. 
The Minister's invitation resulted in fifty five responses.24 The majority of those were from 
lawyers who had already been noted by Chief Judge Trapski as being of the necessary calibre. 
However, two replies were from candidates of the required calibre, but till their applications, 
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neither the decision maker or recommender knew of them. If those two applcations were expressed 
as a statistical failure rate, it would be reasonably acceptable. However, one could equally argue, 
given the prominence of judicial decisions, any such failure must be discountenanced. At least at a 
conceptual level, a compelling query exists as to the number of meritorious candidates, in total, 
who have been previously overlooked. However, one should not get carried away and impute the 
failure to those saddled with the onerous task of keeping dossiers and making recommendations. The 
reality of limited resources means that one must view the responses in a more positive way. That is 
to say, the majority of the replies were from those already considered as belonging to the 
"possibles" list. 
Some of the fifty five respondents expressed interest in High Court appointments. Whether the 
direct approach is used for that Court remains to be seen. The writer though agrees with Judge 
Trapski's view that the type of person most suitable for judicial appointment is s/he who is too busy 
to apply I 
The uncertain system? 
The writer's research is as conclusive as possible. There is, sadly, a paucity of literature on the 
selection process in New Zealand. Hence, if anyone should know how people come to the attention of 
the recommenders, it ought to be the chief recommenders. That there are a number of disparate 
views on the precise mechanics of selection, highlights how uncertain our system is. Whilst it can be 
appreciated that the Minister's initiative has formalised the hitherto informal, it nevertheless does 
not abate fears, that viewed objectively, we the public do not know what happens behind closed doors. 
Further, it is the writer's understanding, the Wairakei initiative was an experiment. It is unclear 
whether the method of approach will be used again in the future. In relation to the Chief Judges, the 
writer has elicited their selection criteria. But given the formalisation of applications, at the 
District Court level, one needs to further inquire into the criteria countenanced by the Solicitor 
General and Secretary for Justice. An inquiry which would probably be premised by an analysis into 
the positions themselves, and how the present incumbents became appointed. It is further most 
unsatisfactory that we do not know by what standards the Attorney General accepts/rejects 
applications. The writer was refused an interview with the Rt Hon Geoffrey Palmer on these 
matters, and thus subject to some public statement we whether, members of the public or legal 
fraternity, will remain out in the cold. 
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Our process is informal. As such its success relies intimately on the professionalism of those in the 
key positions. To date, there have been no feelings or allegations of a politically motivated 
appointment. As stated, the writer submits an appointment is political when the appointee is 
selected for his partisan political sympathies. In a country where there is no Bill of Rights , that 
state of affairs may be quite consistent. In that respect, it is a testament to the integrity of the 
process that Sir Ronald Davision confidently asserts, a person's political leanings were never 
discussed in the consultation phase . Religion did not feature either. The writer doubts whether Sir 
Ronald's confidence can be interpreted as sufficient reason to celebrate an anticipation of future 
advertence to such noble ethics. It is not beyond the realms of posibility that New Zealand law will 
someday be subject to a Bill of Rights. Further, excepting the existence of a Bill of Rights, there 
appears an alarming trend whereby politically sensitive issues are left to the Courts to determine. 
At the time of writing , it appears the proposed Maori Fishing Bill will leave to the High and Court of 
Appeal, the task of specifying Maori fishing rights. If the proposal does require such an exercise of 
judicial power, it is readily concievable the court's resolutions will materially affect not only New 
Zealands fishing industry, but also our economy. They in turn will affect the government's chances of 
re-election. Theoretically a political appointment may legitimate government policy, negating the 
government having to pass the effective legislation, and opening itself up to unfavourable public 
reaction. The writer does not proffer comments on politically sensitive issues which have been 
determined by the courts already. To do so , one would run the risk of imputing politically motivated 
judgment's to some judges. But note, all the writer has attempted to do with the fishing example is 
introduce why a government may want to, in future, make a political appointment. A full discussion 
on this point will follow shortly. 
The non-issues 
For the sake of completeness, the writer first proffers reasons as to why some of the popular 
attacks on the selection process do not, in reality , provide sufficient justification for reform. The 
charges to be discussed have a habit of arousing passionate debates. It is hoped the writer's 
submissions will be received as constructive perspectives. 
The often touted justifications for reform are: 
(1) Judges are chosen from a narrow sector of the community , and thus their 
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decisions do not a represent the will of society; and 
(2) Women are discriminated against in the appointment process. 
An unrepresentative bench? 
This question must be analysed in respect of the limitations of class, age, education and elite 
standing at the bar. Focussing first on class. 
Class or social status are inter-changeable terms. The argument proposes judges belong to the upper 
class of society. Thus their decisions reflect that class' views, whatever they are. However, one 
needs to but research the information available on the twelve High Court appointments made by the 
Rt Hon Geoffrey Palmer over the last five years, to recognise some interesting features.25 All 
twelve appointees have extensive practical experience . Nine were Queen's Counsel , representing 
their experience at the bar, and probably their level of income.26 If class in New Zealand is 
measured by economic wealth , then it is safe to surmise that our Judges do belong to the upper 
echelons of society. However, that classification per se does not import improper motives. Nor 
does it place a limitation on the way in which a judge is to exercise power. It is submitted the 
utterances of Lord Abinger on vicarious liability in Priestly v Fow/e,2.7 have now found their 
rightful place and audience, in front of frustrated Legal System students . There is no evidence that 
in New Zealand, wealth or social status have somehow cocooned practitioners , who later become 
judges, away from the normal courses of life. To assert otherwise is plainly absurd. Reverting to 
the appointees' biographies justifies that conclusion. Gault J, apart from being a Patent and 
Intellectual Property specialist was also the President of the New Zealand Golf Association .28 Gallen 
J was raised in the small Hawke Bay farming town of Waipawa, and an active participant in the 
affairs of the Presbyterian Social Services Association of Hawke Bay and Poverty Bay.29 Smellie J 
has been chairman of the Equal Opportunities Committee.30 Ellis J, former member of the Legal Aid 
Board,31 has also been President of the Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society .32 And perhaps 
the most colourful appointee was Doogue J. His Honour was Chairman of Amnesty lnternational,33 
Chairman of the Nelson/Malborough National Parks and Reserves Board,34 member of the Nelson 
Land Committee, President of the Nelson Institute and President of the Suter Arts Society.34 
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In Sir Ronald Davison's opinion, Geoffrey Palmer preferred to appoint younger judges. This 
practice it appears was also evident between 1968 - 1972.35 Age it is argued is a barrier to being 
in touch with, and appreciative of, younger ideas. Older judges are perceived as the crucible of 
conservatism. That argument however, belies the reality of a lawyer's advocacy training and 
function whereby lateral mental agility has become the hallmark of leading practitioners. But, if as 
was Palmer's preference to appoint younger judges, then how young should they be. It appears as 
young as Thirty three. A 1989 decision saw the appointment of District Court Judge Green.36 With 
respect, one must question the decision. Have relatively young Judges gained sufficient experience? 
Most especially in light of the Law Commission's reformatory measures to increase the jurisdiction 
of the District Court as a Court of first instance.37 The Law Commission have proposed the District 
Court have jurisdiction over all criminal prosecution, where there is a right to trial by jury, 
subject to the transfer of a complex or generally important case to the High Court.38 Further the 
Law Commission envisaged the District Court to have concurrent civil jurisdiction with the High 
Court, except in cases involving statutory supervisory powers, the judicial review of 
Administrative actions, or the exercise of the High Court's inherent jurisdiction .39 
The writer submits Judge Green is perhaps an exceptional case. However, should the practice of 
appointing practitioners in their early thirties become widespread, then it will require close 
examination. 
Education 
This is another elite therefore unrepresentative based argument. Its main proposer, Professor 
Griffiths, with his Oxbridge educated Judge analysis, has received quite scathing criticisms.40 The 
Professor's argument proposes a judge deciding an issue in accordance with the values of her 
educational backround. Hence the Oxbridge acronym. This is a breakdown of the Education Institutes 
patronised by our twelve judges.41 
Auckland University : 3 Henry J 
1 1 
Smellie J 
Anderson J 
Victoria University : 5 Ellis J 
Gault J 
Gallen J 
McGechan J 
Doogue J 
Canterbury University : 3 Williamson J 
WylieJ 
Tipping J 
Otago University : 1 Robertson J 
If the Professor is right, and the writer doubts, then the spread of appointments does not necessarily 
lead to the conclusion of one Universities' psyche being foisted upon the general public. That there 
are more graduates from Victoria University, merely affirms the superiority of Wellington's Law 
School in New Zealand. 
Standino at the Bar 
The New Zealand Legal Profession is distinct from its English counterpart . Whereas in New Zealand 
a lawyer is admitted as a Barrister and Solicitor, the English prefer to maintain the tradition of a 
lawyer being admitted as one or the other. As Pannick suggests, the practice of selecting from the 
ranks of leading barristers severely restricts the range of potential candidates.42 Such a practice, 
by analogy, also precludes academic lawyers from the appointment arena. On this last point, the 
New Zealand experience suggests otherwise. Of the twelve appointees, four have academic 
backgrounds. That is to say , at the time of the their appointment, they had held or were holding 
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lectureship positions. Robertson J was a part time lecturer at Otago University between 1969 and 
1984. 43Tipping J has been a tutor at the University of Canterbury in Evidence and Commercial 
Law, and was Moderator for the Law Schools in the Law of Torts.44 McGechan J was a part time 
lecturer at Victoria University45 and Anderson J was a tutor at Auckland University.46 Despite 
their Honours' contributions to academia, they cannot be categorised as purely academic lawyers 
prior to their appointments. Be that as it may.the crucial question that needs to be considered is 
whether the seniority criteria ought to command the influence that it does at all levels of 
appointments. Lord Hewart is cited as an example of a senior advocate who was unable to temper his 
adversarial approach after being appointed to the bench.47 On the one side is the arguement that 
seniority should not predetermine or influence heavily all appointments. Former Canadian 
Supreme Court Chief Justice Harold Laski is reported as suggesting to Lord Chancellor Sankey that 
his Lordship ought to consider appointing an academic lawyer.48 Similarly, Pannick suggests that 
English solicitors ought not to be disregarded in toto.49 Contrary arguments that are put forward 
are equally compelling. As Samuels JSO maintains:51 
... the best way of maintaining judicial competency is to appoint reasonably competent judges, who 
already know enough to embark on their new task with tolerable efficiency. 
Further, in so far as purely academic lawyers are concerned, former English High Court Judge R 
Megarry's scathing remarks may still find favour in some circles. Megarry asserts:52 
the academic's tempo of life is quite different. It is one thing for ideas and theories to evolve and be 
tested over the years in the study and lecture room, and another thing to judge competing theories in 
the hot-house of the courtroom. 
It is submitted there are a number of interesting, if not provocative arguments to be made. 
However, they are beyond the scope of this paper. In the final analysis, it is a matter that 
approaches the preference of the final decision maker. Thus untill we can ascertain those thoughts, 
one would simply be making arguments which may simply not be sustainable. Moreover, by itself, 
the argument against the status quo, if correct, would not be conclusive enough to warrant the 
substantial reform that this paper will propose. 
Women and the Bench 
It may be comforting to the protagonists on this issue that the most recent Attorney General, former 
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Chief Justice and former Chief District Court Judge all held very strong and positive views on 
women being represented on the bench. That however is not to say that the latest appointments have 
been in some way token. Rather, as Sir Ronald and Chief Judge Trapski aver, first, like any other 
appointment, they had to be the most favourable of the available candidates. The issue of 
representativeness is generally confused with concomitant concerns. Noteably, some argue the lack 
of representation is a consequence of discrimination. The argument is founded on the belief that 
judges are appointed by, and selected from, the 'old boys network'. The assertion is spurious. As Sir 
Robin Cooke points out,53 "in current practice there is no such network". His Honour labels the 
analogy "misleading" and "most unfortunate". The writer accepts Sir Robin's comments, and further 
suggests, if there had been an old boys network then it ought to be regarded as past history and now 
irrelevant. Hodder, fifteen years ago, revealed that of the three thousand practising lawyers, fifty 
were women.54 Further, of those fifty, only one or two had a significant practice in court.SS If 
we recognise that primarily judges are selected according to their practice at the bar, then it is no 
strain either to realise why women were not appointed. 
The make-up of the bar has without doubt been irrevocably changed since then . Sian Elias and 
Lowell Goddard have been admitted to the Inner Bar.56 As Sir Robin Cooke affirms:57 
They and the women who are already serving as District Court Judges, a High <;ourt Master, and in 
Law society office are the first wave of a tide of women coming into prominence in the practice and 
administration of New Zealand Law. 
To reiterate the controversial issue previously canvassed, judges are chosen from , generally , the 
most experienced members of the bar. As such, it is only a matter of time before the first woman 
High Court Judge is to be appointed. 
The writer does not dismiss charges of discrimination completely. Claims of women not being given 
the same opportunities to become experienced practitioners may be valid. According to the New 
Zealand Law Society Poll ,conducted in association with United Building Society , in mid 1987:58 
Sixty-six percent of female respondents agreed that female lawyers are not given the same 
opportunity to do more challenging and prestigious work, but only 19 percent of men agreed. 
If this claim is sustainable, then the concerns ought to be directed at , as the writer suspects, its 
sociological cause. That women are not getting the necessary opportunities, to build up experience, 
LAW LIBRARY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLlf :CTON 
N 
1 
1 4 
does not mean the selection process is at fault for an unrepresentative bench. The selection process 
is by its very nature discriminatory. Thus untill there are equal numbers of men and women at the 
bar, one cannot say the selection process discriminates against women as a class . The process 
discriminates against practitioners with relatively little or no substantial experience. That women 
are over-represented in this category does not mean they are being discriminated against. Rather it 
is a class of practitioner which is discriminated against. One will also find many male practitioners 
in that class. 
The writer has submitted a number of non-issues and it will serve to make a few conluding remarks . 
The writer's classification as non-issues, does not preclude the same points constituting substantial 
concerns in the context of the judicial system as a whole. The focus has necessarily had to be limited 
to a consideration of the selection process. Although the process does not exist in a vacuum , it 
nevertheless is important to recognise that by themselves, even if they were issues, the resultant 
concerns would not justify the substantial reforms this paper will go on to submit. For instance, it 
is realistic to conclude given the greater number of women entering the legal profession , that there 
will as a matter of statistical probability, be more women judges appointed in the future. Thus 
whilst it is a valid concern , it has been categorised as a non-issue because it is a self correcting 
anomaly. Further, the purported issues of age, class and education merely serve to signpost the 
persuasive dangers we could encounter. Therefore, if we countenanced a new selection process, those 
purported issues would persuade us to initiate proposals to subvert, so far as possible, the selection 
of judges who may become unwilling to act in the best interests of the society at large, be 
unresponsive to changing social mores or purport to intergrate the peculiar psyche of her education 
into the law. 
Having considered those popular attacks, it is now possible to focus on the real cause for concern: 
the potential for abuse viz-a-viz political patronage. It is first necessary to consider the role of 
judicial independence. It will then become apparent , why a government would need to make an 
appointment of someone who countenances its political ideologies, if it were to rely upon that judge 
to resolve sensitive issues in the way that it would want. For instance, someone who shares the same 
views as to economic policy, race relations or on penalties for violent crime. 
-4 
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Initially, this section attempts to define what is meant by judicial independence. The writer then 
seeks to consider the intergrity of independence. 
The scope of Judicial independence 
Our New Zealand Judiciary derives a large measure of its independence from the Act Settlement 
1701, which states: 
That after the said limitation shall take effect as aforesaid, judges' commissions be made quandiu se 
bene gesserint,59 and their salaries be ascertained and established; but upon the address of both 
houses of Parliament it may be lawful to remove them. 
There are a number of points to note. First, judicial independence means a judge does not hold office 
at the pleasure of the Crown.60 Once appointed, they are, potentially, there till the statutory 
retirement age of sixty eight. 61 As Geoffrey Palmer asserts, we have yet in this country to 
determine the meanings of "misbehaviour" or "inability".62 It is only upon those grounds that a 
judge can be dismissed from office. Thus Judge Green, cited earlier in the paper, now aged thirty 
three, could expect to preside for yet another thirty five years. The independence of tenure is 
further entrenched by the Act of Settlement's pronouncement for judge's salaries to be ascertained 
and fixed. Accordingly , section 9A of the Judicature Act 1908 requires judge's salaries to be set by 
the Higher Salaries Commission, and they are to be paid out of the Consolidated Account. 
Notwithstanding the independence of tenure, there is a further perception of judicial independence 
which we need to recognise. According to former Chief Justice Sir Richard Wild , Judges "are bound 
by their oaths to deny the right of the Crown to direct them". 63 The oath thus requires judges to 
decide issues independently. In other words, judges are liberated from political pressures to decide 
otherwise. 
However upon closer analysis, Judicial independence when expressed as a denial of the crown's right 
to direct, can only prevail over matters which are deemed justiciable. The writer accordingly, now 
attempts to define this understanding of judicial independence. 
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It is trite law that Parliamentary sovereignty means it can reduce or increase the range of matters 
over which the court can exercise its jurisdiction. There are copious examples of instances where a 
court's jurisdiction has been abated. One of the most striking was the enactment of the Accident 
Compensation Act 1972. A unanimous Court of Appeal decision in Hayward v Phillips 64 held that 
the Accident Compensation Commission were given exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether 
someone has suffered personal injury by accident in New Zealand. Nowithstanding that decision, it 
remains within the ambit of the High Court to consider appeals on questions of law from that 
Commission.65 Examples of where Parliament has increased the court's jurisdiction, are equally 
numerous. Every provision which leaves the Court a discretion or which is poorly drafted can be 
viewed as part of this category. 
From that general consideration of jurisdiction, the focus now shifts to an analysis of what Sir 
Richard means by the word "right". The issue being whether the "right" of parliament to direct, by 
virtue of parliamentary intention as expressed in legislation, absolute or qualified.? The writer 
submits the "right" is qualified. If the contrary meaning were given to Sir Richard's contention, the 
declaration of a judge being able to deny Parliament's absolute right is unsustainable. It would deny 
the sovereign right of Parliament to enact legislation to effect its intentions. The writer thus 
interprets Sir Richard to be saying, it is a judge's duty to deny the qualified right of the crown to 
direct her. The writer points to the following assertion from Gallen J to exact the nature of the 
qualification. His Honour says:66 
While it may be said that a Judge has an obligation to consider 
questions of interpretation from the point of view of the intention of the Legislature, 
a Judge also has obligations to those who are subject to it. 
It is clear from Gallen J's assertion, there are two distinct obligations. The first , is premised on 
Parliament's competence to enact legislation to direct certain courses of activities. The second 
obligation is owed by a Judge to those who become subject to the law. Parliament's right to direct 
must necessarily be qualified as it cannot be effected unless the intention is clearly expressed and 
unequivocal. The obligations, in respect of provisions with ambiguous interpretations, are 
therefore reconcilable. For those provisions, the writer submits a judge enjoys a measure of 
independence free from parliamentary direction. That is however not to claim judges are free to 
decide the law as it takes their fancy. Rather the judge when the intention is unclear, has the duty to 
consider the facts of each case, and decide whether it may be the intention of the provision to sanction 
N 
1 
1 7 
the actions of the instant defendant. For provisions where there are mixed intentions, she must 
decide which intention to give effect to in view on the merits of the case. 
For the sake of completeness, the writer points out the 1978 Royal Commission on the Courts, 
definition of the value of judicial indepence as being "the only real bulwark against arbitrary 
power".67 However, with respect, the Commissioner's view is erroneous. The writer draws on 
Dicey's sentiments that parliament has the legal power to provide for the murder of all blue eyed 
babies.68 As Professor Ken Keith asserts "as a matter of law, the Courts cannot deny that 
sovereignty".69 The writer adds, in light of the previous discussion, a court cannot deny the 
sovereignty if it is unequivocally expressed. Particularly so in our jurisdiction where we have no 
Bill of Rights, entrenching the right to life. 
To conclude, judicial independence may be perceived as the independence of tenure. Further, the 
concept relates to the independent assessment of statutory provisions, to clarfy or prescribe the 
purported intention of the legislature. 
Judicial Independence and political pressure 
The strength judicial independence provides the biggest motive for abuse. In Lord Keith of Kinkel's 
opinion, "it is undesirable that anybody holding a judicial office should appear to be associated with 
any party political view at all."70 The merit of such a declaration must be viewed in the context of 
both political party affilliation, and in the judgments themselves. On the first point, Sir Robin 
Cooke expressed to the writer, since becoming judge in 1972, he has refrained from exercising his 
franchise. 71 On the second point, Sir Robin would submit that individual political sympathies do 
not have any significant influence on a collective judgment,72 citing Wybrow v Chief Electoral 
Office 73 as confirmation. 
Recent history provides a number of examples of elected politicians attacking members of the 
Judiciary. At the outset, the writer adverts thereader to the following constitutional principles as 
summarised by Professor de Smith. That learned author writes:74 
... by convention judges must refrain from politically partisan activities; and 
although they can criticise the working and content of legislation and the conduct of 
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members of the executive they should be careful not to take sides in matters of 
political controversy ... [In addition], by convention members of the Executive are 
expected to preserve a reciprocal restraint when commenting on the words and deeds 
of judges, though if criticised by a judge they are not obliged to remain mute, and if a 
judge makes politically controversial remarks a robust answer can be offered. 
The Standing Orders of the House of Representatives states: 
179 Unbecoming References to the House, Judiciary , etc. - No member shall use 
unbecoming words against the House or any member thereof against any member of 
the Judiciary or against any stature unless for the purpose of moving for its repeal or 
in speaking to any such motion. 
Despite those constitutional rules , Members of Parliament like John Banks have chosen to make 
political attacks on the Judiciary of a personal nature. The attack the writer finds most distasteful 
was made in 1984, in Parliament.75 The member for Whangarei criticised" weak kneed judicial 
officers who let the police down time and time again ... spending too much time mollycoddling the 
thugs.". The criticism is distasteful in respect of the imputing the characteristic of being "weak 
kneed" to a Judge. Further, in respect of the Judges paternalistic attitude to thugs. Furthermore, the 
suggestion that Judges are there to legitimate the causes of the police as of right, is most 
disconcerting. The writer submits the attack reflects Mr Bank's apparent ignorance of basic 
Constitutional principles. The writer countenances Member of Parliament Mr Minogue's (as he was) 
sentiments: "What is the purpose of a politician who publicly insults a Judge? What is his purpose 
if it's not intimidation?"76 Mr Banks' most recent attack drew criticism from New Zealand Law 
Society President Graham Cowley. Mr Cowley issued this media statement:77 
It is a well established principle that anyone is free to criticise a sentence or a decision the courts . 
This principle relates to a criticism or discussion of the sentence or decision only. It is destructive 
of the judicial system to descend to criticism of the Judge personally when it is the sentence or 
decision to which the remarks should properly be directed. 
Our system of justice is built strongly on separation between the judiciary and the executive arm of 
the government. The freedom of citizens of any country is reliant upon an independent judiciary. 
-~ 
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The writer submits the criticism was long overdue. The Auckland District Law Society noted when 
Mr Banks made some of his judicial attacks, he was a member of the National Government. 78 They 
thus expressed surprise and disappointment that the "Attorney-General had not been more outspoken 
in that role in defence of the Judiciary against the recurring political attacks."79 The Attorney 
General of the time was a member of the National government.BO That inertia may point to another 
disturbing cosideration . It suggests the discordant functions of Attorney-General and Minister of 
Justice being held by the same person. That is to say, the function of Attorney General cannot , in 
practice, be fully exercised by a hybrid person who can be compromised by partisan politics. 
Moreover, in light of that consideration , one would not expect to find some form of collective 
responsibility binding successive Attorney-Generals to defend personal attacks on judges not chosen 
by them personally. 
Despite the barbed attacks by some elected politicians, the Judiciary remain stoutly independent. 
From the foregoing discussion it will be apparent if the government was to make a pol itical 
appointment, it must appoint someone who already ascribes to its ideologies. As upon appointment 
the judge becomes independent. The writer proposes that the most substantial reason for reform is 
the need to remove this potential for partisan political patronage. Patronage which makes a 
mockery of litigation on all types of issues. Most particularly those contentious issues which are 
delicately balanced , and their resolution depends on the interpretation of the policy the law aims to 
regulate . 
With the ensuing discussion, the writer seeks to establish , the Attorney General , in respect of his 
appointment power, as a potential conduit effecting the government's will , viz-a-viz the 
appointment of judges with homogenous political views. Alternately , as a conduit , the Attorney 
General can circumscribe the appointment of a candidate with diametrically opposed political views . 
------- ---
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The office of Attorney General 
The Attorney General is a prerogative officer appointed by the Governor General on the advice of the 
Prime Minister.81 According to Smith L J "everybody knows that the Attorney-General is the head 
of the English Bar."82 In New Zealand, that eminent status has mostly been held concurrently with 
the Portfolio for Justice.83 It is therefore submitted experience shows the office to have been held 
by a political being in three respects. First as a political candidate elected according to partisan 
ideologies and policies. Second, the prerogative has been exercised in favour of those elected 
politicians of the government of the day. Thirdly, and an associated point , the prerogative has been 
mostly exercised in favour of those elected politicians who form the executive arm of the 
government. There does therefore exist in theory the opportunity for the position to be used as a 
conduit effecting government ideology. 
The Attorney General and political nuetrality? 
In the English system, from whence our prerogative has evolved,84 it is accepted practice for the 
Attorney General to not be also a Cabinet Minister. According to Professor Brookfield, "the 
practice is seen to be consistent with the independence from political pressure that is expected of an 
Attorney General."85 The English practice, and concern is not alien to New Zealand. For ten 
years, the Attorney-Generals Act 1866 expressly declared, an Attorney-General could not also be a 
Cabinet Minister or member of either House of the Legislature. The New Zealand Parliamentary 
Debates chronicle heated debate during the second reading of the repealing Attorney General Bill 
1876.86 The full implications of those debates must be viewed in the context of the many functions 
of the Attorney General. For our purposes, the sometimes strong sentiments are not lost in the 
consideration of politically motivated appointment. The Hon. Mr Waterhouse, in the Legislative 
Council argued:87 
If the Law Officers of the Crown held political offices, it would be impossible for 
them, in the consideration of various matters to which their attention might be 
invited, not to labour under the influence of this bias. 
If one accepts the Honourable member's submission , the tacit presumption is all appointments since 
1876, have been influenced by partisan political bias. As since the passing of the Attorney General 
Act 1876, the position of Attorney General has been held by a member, of the government or 
executive. The writer submits Mr Waterhouse's view cannot be easily dismissed. To reiterate Sir 
-~--------
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Ronald Davison's comment, he did not discuss with the Attorney, a candidate's political standing. That 
however, does not preclude from the realm of possibility, the Attorney General independently 
eliciting the information. Further, the charge of political patronage is a sensitive issue. It would 
therefore be unlikely for the Attorney General to require the Chief Justice of New Zealand to furnish 
data on a candidates political persuasion. If partisan bias has affected the outcome of an appointment, 
the writer prefers to err on the conservative, by classifying them as bona fide mistakes or mere 
inadvertance. 
The writer submits one must draw an important distinction. The previous discussion has focussed on 
a political appointment predicated on the candidate's political standing. The candidate's stance, 
synonymous with the government's, gives the government the opportunity to leave sensitive political 
issues to the courts. Further, with an eye to the future, such appointees may make it difficult for 
future governments to give effect to their particular policies. The Attorney General, in this sense, 
can satisfy such an intention by being the conduit effecting government policy. There is on the other 
hand a distinct and perhaps more restricted way to view political appointments. The alternate 
appreciation centers on the ideology of the person holding the Attorney General's position. It would be 
his personal ideologies ,and not the government's, which are effected upon the exercise of the 
appointment power. The justification for the latter appointment is summarised by Kirby J88 (as he 
was):89 
Politicians know that governments come and go. By judicial appointment they enjoy 
the possibility of influencing public affairs long after they have themselves 
relinquished power, voluntarily or involuntarily. 
That appreciation of political appointments does not necessarily always lead abuse, in terms of the 
power being exercised if favour of appointees whose political sympathies lie with the government of 
the day. On the contrary, some appointments attributable to that alternate appreciation can be quite 
positive. An instant example may be the relatively recent increase in the number of women judges. 
That occurrence may be a manifestation of the Geoffrey Palmer's committment to equality of 
opportunity. 
To conclude this part of the paper, the writer submits there is the opportunity for the government, 
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using the Attorney General as the conduit, to make political appointments. It may want to effect its 
will on sensitive political issues, but realistically it cannot for fear of adverse public reaction in 
one way or the other. In that respect, the writer countenances and recognises the worth of Sir Robin 
Cooke's observation as perhaps highlighting the types of issues upon which the government may 
defer the decision to the courts. Sir Robin asserts, multi-cultural problems are the greatest this 
country will have to face. A court comprised of judges sharing the government's true view is thus a 
very useful device to effect those intentions. The most likely court appears to be the Court of Appeal. 
It is that court in which matters of law and statutory policy are determined. As such the writer does 
not accept the Law Commission's recommendation to abolish the Privy Council as New Zealand's final 
appellate court.90 It may, if the selection process is abused, provide an independent view on 
sensitive matters. 
Further, abuse may occur as a consequence of the Attorney General applying idiosyncratic standards. 
The writer submits there is a pressing need for the Attorney General to make public the parameters 
within which appointments are made. 
As a final matter, by analogy it is apparent that in the same way in which a political appointment is 
made, an appointment may be rejected by virtue of the candidates political sympathies being 
inconsistent with the governments. Thus again one may suggest the same types of arguments, as 
canvassed previously. 
Is there a check on a political appointment? 
The short awnser is no. Given the independence of the judge, how will we know when a judge will 
have decided in accordance with the reason for which she was appointed? However, even if a political 
appointment were detectable, there appears from overseas experience a high degree of inertia 
impeding substantial selection reforms. A discussion shorlty. 
Final decision makers; a comparative analysis 
As stated, shortly the writer will show how entrenched the informal process of selection is overseas. 
But first a general discussion on the role of politics in the selection methods of other jurisdictions 
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United States of America 
Appointments to the State Judiciary are determined in one of four ways. There is the appointment 
by the State Governor, popular election, election by Legislature or appointment by the State 
Governer which is later subject to a public confirmation vote. For the Supreme Court, it is the 
President who makes the appointment, but the senate must confirm the appointment with a two 
thirds majority. 
According to Mayer,91 a Governor appointees are normally selected from the members of his/her 
party. Thus it is a rarity for the governor to make a non-political appointment, if at all an 
appointment of someone affiliated to the opposition. The election by legislature method is by its 
nature dominated by politics. Political considerations are further prominent for those seeking 
appointment by popular selection. Mayer's research concluded that of the thirty five states using 
popular selection, twenty one require the candidate to be supported by a Political Party .92 Hence, 
active participation is a pre-requisite to success. 
The writer does not propose at this stage, to deal with the American methods in great depth. An 
extensive discussion will follow later in the paper. In the limited context the writer now raises the 
American practices, one can conclude politics and political alliances materially affect a candidates 
chances of not only election, but also the retention of office upon election. That state of affairs raises 
its own special concerns. They will be discussed shortly in respect of the State of California's public 
confirmation of incumbent judges. 
West Germany 
Half the judges are elected by the Lower House of the Federal Parliament and half by the Upper 
House.93 
England 
The Queen upon the advice of the Prime Minister appoints the Lord Chancellor, all the Law Lords, 
the Lords Justices of Appeal , the Lord Chief Justice, the Master of the Rolls and the President of the 
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Family Division.94 
According to Shereet, the Lord Chancellor's appointment is normally based upon political 
grounds.95 The position is comprised of a unique combination of tasks , and is comparable to our 
Attorney-General in three respects. First as chief legal advisor to the Government. Second as a 
member of the executive, and thirdly tenure of office is determined by and relies upon the Prime 
Minister being in office. There the parallels cease. The Lord Chancellor can be distinguished by his 
exercise of judicial powers , position as the speaker of the House of Lords, and as a frequent 
defender or expositor of government policy.96 The Lord Chancellor advises the Prime Minister on 
potential candidates for appointments made by the Prime Minister. But he alone is responsible for 
the appointment of High Court (Puisne) and Circuit Judges, Recorders, Supreme Court Masters and 
Registrars, Stipendary Magistrates and County Court Registrars. 
Conflict and the status guo 
The writer has outlined why and how the potential abuse of political patronage may occur. However, 
the danger of such an abuse occuring is still classified as a mere possibility. There are overseas 
examples of where the danger is more than a potential. The writer submits them to be apparent 
abuses . Hence the following discussion. Consider for instance the sentiments of Samuels J. His 
Honour recognised in 1980, the vulnerability of the New South Wales system to political patronage, 
and then went on to say "appointments which might be said to be "political" have been rare."97 In 
his Honour's opinion an appointment may be political if the appointee :98 
-has sat as a member of the legislature ; or 
-has been an unsuccessful candidate for election in a party 
or 
-has held office in a party machine ; and 
-has been appointed by his own party. 
political interest ; 
Samuels J then confirms, to his knowledge, three of the then thrity six judges of the Supreme Court 
might possibly saitisfy any of those criteria. With respect , those three cannot be classified as a 
"rare" political appointments. Perhaps if it was three in the last thrty six years it may remotely be 
so classified. 
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Australia's judicial history provides another curious example. Former Labor Attorney-General and 
Cabinet Minister Lionel Murphy, was appointed in 1975 by Labor Prime Minister Gough Whitlam 
to the High Court of Australia. The New South Wales Legislative Assembly expressed the concern of 
unrestrained patronage, and set up a Select Committee to inquire into the appointment procedure.99 
Its main recommendation was enacted, albeit slightly modified, and the High Court of Australia Act 
1979 now provides for the Federal Government to consult the States on proposed appointments.100 
By way of completeness, one must note that the New Zealand experience shows one example of where 
one person has held the position of Attorney General and later was appointed a judge. Sir James 
Prendergast was appointed Attorney-General in 1867, following the statutory requirement for the 
position to be filled by a non-political person.101 It would appear, that as a condition of his 
employment, he was promised the first vacancy on the benches.102 The first vacancy occurred 
upon the death of Sir George Arney, the then Chief Justice. 
The Australian examples serve to highlight how entrenched the conventions an appointment system 
are. Despite the apparent abuses of political patronage there appears to have been no great public 
outcry of abuse. Even the New South Wales Select Committee only went as far as recommending 
mandatory consultation, with the final decision remaining with the Federal Government. From 
that, one is entitled to question whether there was in fact a step forward , in the reformatory sense . 
The writer has previously expressed Professor Shrereet's assertion, of the Lord Chancellor's 
position being filled by a political appointee. Yet there are two hallmark events which distinguish 
the appointment of the Lord Chancellor from the Australian examples. Cognizance of which leads to 
the conclusion that the Lord Chancellor's is an appointment made by a political figure as opposed to 
an appointment for party political sympathies.The first concerned a nineteenth century Prime 
Minister's attempted usurpation of the Lord Chancellor's convention based power to be the sole 
appointer of Puisne judges. Lord Chancellor Eldon is recorded as having reminded the King that for 
the Prime Minister to appoint that class of judge would be an abuse ofthe Lord Chancellor's 
position.103 The Lord Chancellor's choice was thereafter appointed. Further, as Lord Jowitt L C 
stated in 1953: "I can fairly say that we have established a tradition in which 'politics' and 
'influence' are now completely disregarded." The second monumental event concerns the very 
politically active Lord Hailsham L C. Having been a Labour Member of Parliament, Cabinet 
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Minster and trouble shooter, his Lordship was appointed Lord Chancellor by a Conservative Prime 
Minister: Margaret Thatcher.1 04 
But even if the writer is wrong with the argument that politics plays no discernable part in English 
appointments, history provides a sober consideration that ameliorates the risk of political 
appointees manifestly dislaying their sympathies on the bench. According to the Chief Justice of the 
State of Wisconsin Nathan Heffernan:105 
I suppose, of course, the great surprise to everbody was when Earl Warren was 
appointed Chief Justice of the United States by Eisenhower. He turned out to be the 
great champion of civil liberties when his background was thought different. 
There are many points to be gleaned from Heffernan CJ's comments. The most pertinent of which is 
the frank realisation that the appointment criterion, perhaps including political sympathy, can 
only indicate what type of judge a candidate will make. As such, if political sympathy is the core 
reason for apointment, then that intention many never come to fruition . 
For the sake of completeness, the writer makes a few comments on the demise of the late Justice 
Murphy of the High Court of Australia. The late judge was convicted of a charge of attempting to 
pervert the course of justice, by trying to influence the decision of an inferior court judge.106 The 
trial judge, Cantor J in sentencing Lionel Murphy said: 107 
The conviction of a judge for such an offence must result in a penalty which reflects 
the abhorence and disapproval of this court and of all right-thinking members of the 
community and, at the same time, stand as a dreadful warning to all who might 
similarly transgress. The commission of this crime has done a terrible injury to the 
administration of justice and in the minds of many, has adversely affected and raised 
doubts as to the integrity and standing of every judge in this country ... Lionel 
Murphy, I sentence you to imprisonment for eighteen months. 
The conviction was quashed on appeal by the New South Wales Supreme Court . However, the 
problems did not end there. Other charges of impropriety, were being investigated by a Commission 
of Inquiry. Murphy J returned to the bench. But, the reaction of his brethren judges, were mixed. It 
seems Chief Justice Gibbs was displeased with Murphy J's return. The Chief Justice issued a 
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statement saying it was essential for the integrity and reputation of any Judge of the Court, to be 
seen to be beyond question.108 It was therefore undesirable for Murphy J to sit before the findings 
of the Commission of Inquiry were revealed. It appeared to Murphy J, the accord reached with the 
Chief Justice, that he not to sit till the allegations were refuted, was an accord of necessity. His 
Honour was under the impression, if he did not agree to the Chief Justices' wishes, then other Judges 
would go on strike.109 The Commission of inquiry did not report. Lionel Murphy died, just under 
three months after the instigation of the Commission.11 O 
There is not a great deal we can be satisfied with from the Murphy saga. It was never established if 
the improprieties were due to his attempt to enforce the politics of the Labor party. In the context of 
this paper, it must however be said, despite the problems surrounding Murphy J's political 
appointment, there is still no substantive move afoot in Australia to take the appointment function 
out of the hands of politicians. 
The writer is an eternal optimist. It is hoped, we in New Zealand will act will more vigour at the 
first instance of a political appointment. An alternative to the current New Zealand practice of 
appointment was mooted in this county in 1973. The then Minister of Justice, the Hon A. M. 
Findlay QC, suggested the establishment of a Committee, if appointments were to be made from 
members of the legal profession who were not prominent members of the bar. 111 However, the 
constituent group that has received most attention on this matter was the 1978 Royal Commission on 
the Courts. The remainder of this paper analyses their major recommendation . 
A judicial commission 
The idea of a Judicial Commission has been considered throughout the Commonwealth.112 However, 
the proposals remain unactioned. In New Zealand the Judicial Commission was central to the Royal 
Commission's Report . It therefore touched uon a broad range of matters. This paper analyses the 
Commission as it relates to the appointment of judges. The relevant recommendations may be 
summarised: 113 
1. A Judicial Commission should be established to consist of:-
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-the Chief Justice (Chairman) 
-A Supreme Court Judge; (as it was) 
-The Chief District Court Judge; 
-The Solicitor General; 
-The Secretary for Justice; 
-Two members nominated by the New Zealand Law Society and appointed by the 
Governor General. 
2. There was to be an Appointments Committee of the Commission with the following membership:-
-the Chief Justice; (Chairman) Except when his successor is being considered. In 
that circumstance, the Chief Justice would be replaced by a senior High Court Judge. 
-the Chief District Court Judge 
-Two non-political government appointees; eg. the Solicitor- General and the 
Secretary for Justice. 
-two nominations from the New Zealand Law Society. 
(3) The Appointment Committee was to advise and tender recommendations to the Attorney-General. 
The final decision remained with the Attorney-General for all judges, with the exception of the Chief 
Justice. That appointment to be made by the Prime Minister. 
(4) The Attorney-General/ Prime Minister could only appoint from the Appointment Committee's 
nominations. However, the Attorney or Prime Minister could reject all nominations. 
(5) With the exception of the Chief Justice and Chief District Court Judge, membership of the 
Committee should not remain static. 
(6) The committee was to provide the means of dealing with complaints against judges. 
(7) Appointments to Statutory Tribunals should also be made by the committee, whenever 
practicable. 
The recommendations do no more than formalise the practice of consultation . The power of 
appointment remains with the Attorney General and Prime Minister. If one takes the view that 
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formalising consultation adds little, then one is also entitled to submit that the proposed reform was 
of little consequence. 
By comparison, the English Justice sub-committee recommended a much more useful measures for 
reform.114 The sub-committee proposed the Lord Chancellor controlled the appointment 
machinery. Further, they recommended the establishment of an advisory appointments committee, 
its principle task being to collate informaton for appointments. The advisory committee would be 
comprised of representatives of the Law Society, the Bar, academic lawyers, the judiciary and 
"perhaps some lay members, eg. some higly trained and experienced personnel officers skilled in 
selection procedures." It is testament to how entrenched the selection procedures are in England, that 
the sub-committee's recommendations have not been adopted. 
The New Zealand version of the Appointments Committee has since gone by the way. However, one 
notes the eventuality was not unexpected. The judiciary of the time rejected the proposal. It was 
felt improper that such a body could discipline judges, when Parliament itself could not except for 
reasons of misbehaviour or inability. It can be noted at this point, the Canadian Judicial Commission 
has the statutory power to recommend that a judge be removed from office. 11 5 In a relatively 
recent controversy the Commission held the actions of Justice Berger, of the Supreme Court of 
British Columbia, warranted a recommendation for removal, but chose not to exercise it. Berger J 
was considered by the Judicial Commission as indiscreet.11 6 His Honour, in 1981, had delivered a 
number of speeches urging the adoption the draft Canadian Constitution when it included "native" or 
"aboriginal" peoples rights. Accordingly, when those rights were deleted, Berger J felt compelled to 
criticise the actions of those responsible.117 In 1983, after considerable pressure from the Chief 
Justice who appeared to have sided with the Judicial Commission, Berger J resigned after twelve 
years on the bench. 
The writer's reform 
The writer propses that New Zealand adopts a Judicial Appointments Committee. A committee which 
has the Attorney-General as its chairman. It would also be comprised of the Chief Justice, 
President of the Court of Appeal and Chief District Court Judge. Further, like the English proposal, 
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an advisory panel is set up to process the applications. The writer would propose that this panel be 
co-ordinated by an able personnel officer. The risk of a political appointment may be perceived as a 
mere possibility. But the writer submits, it is a substantial risk. Substantial because of the 
surreptitious way in which it can be exercised. As stated earlier, if the government were to make a 
political appointment, they would appoint a person already ascribing to its ideologies. Have there 
been instances already in our judicial history? Bearing that in mind, perhaps the most important 
change; the Appointment Committee will be charged with making the appointment. Their decision 
shall be a collective one. 
Alternative Reforms 
It remains therefore, to discuss the more interesting reformatory alternatives. One may like to 
follow the path of some European countries who use career judges. Those judges are not appointed 
from the range of practicing lawyers, as outlined earlier in the paper. Rather, they undertake 
University education to learn how to become a judge. 
Further, one may suggest, we use lay people as judges. As finders of fact , there seems to be no real 
reason why lay people are not used. However, whether at the District or High Court, a trial judge has 
not only to discern the material facts of a case, he must also give Jury directions on points of law. 
Particularly technical evidence hearsay and relevance rules. A lay person may obviously study those 
rules. But one could really question if at the end of that persuit, they could still be classified as a lay 
judge. 
The often touted selection process for possible adoption in New Zealand is the American elective 
system. Hence the following discussion. 
Selection by election: Have the Americans got it right! 
Its merit is predicated on the view that the choice, is the will of the people. Moreover, it is the will 
of the constituents in whose area the judge will preside. Despite these noble assertions, the writer 
submits that the elective system is not a realistic alternative for New Zealand. There are a number 
of problems, both in its implementation and credibility. If elections are to be effective for New 
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Zealand, then judges ought to be chosen for specific areas by the populace of the area. As such quite 
significant administrative work would need to be done to work out jurisdictional boundaries. Would 
the areas be set according to general election boundaries, or perhaps be drawn according to crime 
statistics? We also come back to the question raised previously in the paper. Who is best able to 
choose a judge? Are there, and if so, what types of rules will prevail in election campaigns? There 
is the further problem of funding. Does it come form the public purse, or private contributions? 
Madam Justice Shirley Abrahamson of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, supporter of the elective 
system explains her experience:118 
It is a big state you are running, in the mid of winter with snow, so technically it is 
difficult, Also you need to raise of a lot of money, and that raises special problems 
for the judiciary ... There are groups that organise, usually along professional or 
occupational lines, and contribute money to campaigns in the United States. I did not 
take group money. My money came from individual contributions, which were 
limited in size ... l think my average campaign contribution was about $25. So you 
have to see a lot of people and raise a lot of money. We tried to be sure not the take 
money from people who had cases pending, or cases that had just been decided, so it 
did not look as if I was being bought or paid off. We tried very hard to be free of any 
appearance of impropriety. But that raises difficulties in itself. In my particular 
situation, where we had, say, one thousand to two thousand people contributing, 
could not possibly remember them all. So it might be that somebody would soon after 
come to the court, although we tried to avoid that. .. But it does raise problems, it does 
raise questions and gives me a discomfort level. I have no answer. 
As with any system aimed at promoting the 'public interest', one needs to consider whether the 
public will warm to the invitation. There are ofcourse two divergent views. The first may be 
summarised by Abrahamson J. Her Honour says "we had an election earlier this month and 
something like ten to fifteen percent of the people voted. So that is sad."119 The second view 
requires a little further ananlysis. 
"Bye bye Birdie"120 and "Shaking the Judical Perch"121 
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Those were the types of headlines to be seen in the popular press, in the lead up to the State of 
California's public retention vote of their Supreme Court Judges in 1986. 
The barbs were directed at Chief Justice Rose Bird. Her Honour was appointed to that position in 
1977 at the age of thirty seven.122 According to one observer, "She had two strikes against her the 
day she was appointed: She was a young woman who had never been on the bench.". 123 The 
subsequent demise of Chief Justice Bird at the polls, highlights in the writer's view the inherent 
problems associated with selection by election, or in her Honour's case retention by election. Before 
the discussion, a brief overview of California's appointments procedure. 
The confirmation and retention compromise 124 
Appointment to the California Supreme Court prior to 1934 was predicated upon a candidate winning 
a contested election, as provided by the Constitution. Tenure of office being ten years. But, it appears 
by the turn of the century, judicial campaigns to secure appointment's were, "every bit as bitter and 
controlled by political parties as those for other state-wide offices". There were two divergent 
schools of thought as to reform. One group maintained judges ought to be appointed for life. With the 
appointment to be made by the Governer. The other faction balked at the idea of giving the 
constitutional right of the people to select judges to the Govern er. 
Thereafter, a compromise was reached. The Governer makes the initial appointment. The appointee is 
confirmed by the Commission on Judicial Appointments, comprised of the Chief Justice, the senior 
Justice of the Courts of Appeal and the Attorney General. As an aside, it appears this confirmation is 
cosmetic. There has not been any instance where the Governer's appointee has not been confirmed. 
Further, the writer is unaware how it is that they decide, and persuant to what power they execute 
their function. Both those points are beyond the scope of context in which this paper raises the 
California experience. The Governer's appointee, once confirmed by the Commission, is then subject 
to public confirmation at the next general election. Thereafter, the judge's tenurn is secure for at 
least twelve years. Upon the expiration of that period, a judge must win a public retention vote to 
continue for another twelve year period. If they so desired, after that twelve year term, they could 
again seek another twelve year term by a retention election. President of the California District 
Attorney's Association, Michael Bradbury, presents one way of viewing the elections:125 
-· ('\ -· ~ 
33 
The people would decide if a judge had given them the honest, intelligent and fearless 
services they have a right to expect. 
A less clear cut way of viewing the elections is the following form Professor Zimring , of Berkeley 
Law School: 126 
You walk the tightrope between democratic accountability and popular passion . 
Everybody agrees accountability is fine and passion stinks, but how do you tell the 
difference? 
Chief Justice Bird and the polls 
Prior to the her appointment as Chief Justice by Liberal Governer Jerry Brown, Rose Bird was an 
unknown. Her Honour won the confirmation vote by a slender 51 .8% margin.127 It is unclear why 
her Honour faced a retention vote before the end of the twelve year term . 
When Chief Justice Bird lost the November 1986 retention election , she along with two other 
liberal appointees : Associate Justices Reynoso and Grodin who were also defeated, created judicial 
history. They were the first judges since the inception of the 1934 reform to have been defeated at 
the polls. Arguably, the associate justices lost their seats due to their appointments also being made 
by a liberal governer. 
The issues were clearly defined. By public referendum, the State of California re-introduced capital 
punishment in 1977. Chief Justice Bird's opponents, publicised her Honour's record of voting to 
reverse all fifty five death sentences that were brought to the court. It may be of cursory interest to 
note a 1985 poll showed 83% of the respondents favoured the death penalty .129 Thus in line with 
public opinion, if not parasitically so, Republican Governer George Deukmejian along with the 
California District Attorney's Association, accused Chief Justice Bird and the Supreme Court "of 
systematically blocking executions, and thus being soft on crime". 130 The anti-Bird lobby included 
the Crime Victims for Court Reform group, comprising victims of crime and their families , and in 
some cases the parents or spouses of murder victims.131 The California District Attonery's 
Association's case was simple, Chief Justice Bird by voting agaist the death sentence, was not 
applying the law, as was the public's desire in bringing back the death sentence. Thus to the 
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Association, it was not a question of judicial independence, but of judicial incompetence. The 
argument however presumes the law was enacted in a form which was clear and unambiguous with no 
room for discretion. However, section 190.2 of the Penal Code of the State of California makes it 
clear, the penalty for a defendant found guilty of murder in the first degree, under certain special 
circumstances, is death or confinement for life without the possibility of parole. The section leaving 
the final penalty to judicial discretion, appears to the writer to sink the Association's contention . 
That is to say, even if first degree murder coming under the special circumstances is proved, a judge 
is not mandatorily required to pass a sentence of death. Moreover, it appears certain subdivisions of 
section 190.2 were unconstitutional. In People v Davenport, 132 Chief Justice Bird held a 1978 
Penal Code ammendment to section 190.2, subdivision 9(18) as to the proof of torture, was 
unconstitutional. Her Honour relying on the authority of the United States Supreme Court judgment 
in Godfrey v Georgia.133 In that decision, the Supreme Court held a capital sentencing must 
provide a meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which the penalty is imposed, from 
the many cases in which it is not. Thus if a provision did not admit of a meaningful distinction , it 
violated the Eighth Ammendment of the American Constitution. 
In Clyde Leland's opinion , senior assistant editor for the California Lawyer publication, voters are 
not interested in the finer points of constitutional law. Prior to Chief Justice Bird's ousting , Leland 
wrote :134 
In short, the public are not asking for a legalistic explanation of death sentence 
reversals. They seem to want swift and definite enforcement of capital punishment. 
While the political groups are debating , the court will be hearing more capital 
appeals, and each time another death sentence is reversed , the California District 
Attorney's Association and the anti- retention groups will be ready to charge that the 
court is ignoring the will of the people as expressed by the legislature. 
The writer draws upon Leland's comments to show how open to abuse the election system is. To that 
end the writer submits the public were not presented with the proper considerations on which to 
base a sound judgment. Rather, the anti-Bird sectors seriously underminded the worth of retention 
elections. The campaign against Chief Justice Rose Bird began two years before the November 1986 
election .135 Over that period, they are reported to have ammassed at least $5 million.136 It was 
master minded by Bill Roberts, who previously has been stragetist to Ronald Reagan's gubernatorial 
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campaign in 1966.137 The strategy included emotional and highly charged television, newspaper 
and radio commercials , house to house canvassing, direct mail advertising and public meetings to 
denounce the Chief Justice.138 The California District Attorney's Association released a report 
claiming the court as "anti-law enforcement". 139 The gruesome facts of different cases were used 
in newspaper advertising campaigns.140 The defendant in People v Mozingo won his appeal on the 
grounds that he was inadequately represented.141 The court held the trial counsel rendered 
inadequate representation in failing to investigate possible diminished capacity or insanity defences, 
"which deprived the defendant of a potentially meritorious defence or mitigating circumstance" .142 
The facts of the case. The defendant in his words "boned" his step-mother. In other words he 
sexually violated her by rape. Thereafter he proceeded to bind her naked body with wire. First 
wrapping one end of the wire around her ankles, and running the rest along her back to finally be 
secured around her neck. The defendant then pulled the slack of the wire tight, to bend her legs and 
head back, thus effecting a slow but sure method of strangulation. The writer submits, if one was not 
concerned with the death sentence you probably would be after the barrage of advertising criticising 
the court "who let the murderers go free". 143 By comparison, Rose Bird headed her own campaign . 
Her Honour having previously fired two campaign strategists because they wanted her to send "direct 
mail which said nasty things". 144 Finance also appeared to be a problem, estimated at around $1 
million.145 
The death sentence, provides two distinct considerations. First the killing must be classified as 
murder in the first degree that comes under the special circumstances provisions. Secondly, there is 
no compulsion that if the first requirement were satisfied, a death sentence would necessarily 
follow . From the writer's research, the Chief Justice's reversal judgments were based on question of 
law. That is to say, whether first degree murder under the special circumstances had been proved. 
In the case of Mozingo it could not be established if the defendant was guilty, due to the potentially 
meritorious defences of insanity or diminished responsibility. There was no question of whether to 
impose a death sentence or incarceration for life. The case did not get to the sentencing phase. Thus 
despite their opinion that Bird C J was incompetent, the public were not justified in rejecting a 
Judge who purported to act within the law. The case may have been different if the issue was as to 
penalty, in the sense ofthe charge being proved. In the writer's view, a judge ought to consider 
public opinion. The anti-Bird lobby painted the picture of her Honour effecting liberal views at the 
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Bench. But, Penal legislation by its very nature, means a judge is placed in the peculiar position of 
ensuring justice is done, in respect of the legislation as the constructed or actual will of the people, 
and in respect of the individual. That is why we in New Zealand countenance the concept of Judicial 
Independence. Moreover, Judicial competence does not mean giving effect to the desire of the people , 
irrespective of how that desire is expressed in law. Rather in the writer's view, that is jucicial 
incompetence. The public of California cannot be imputed with the intention of rejecting competent 
judges, in the hope of replacing them with incompetent ones. It may have been the heat and odour of 
sun tan lotion which distracted their attention. But more likely, their perceptions of the Bird court 
were fueled by the emotional arguments of the anti-Bird lobby. 
A further matter which needs to be briefly dealt with, is the degree of political influence prevalent 
in the lead up to the election. It appears the Chief Justice faced considerable pressure from Governer 
Deukmejian. And at times hitting back at campaign rallies, referring to the Governer as one of the 
bully boys out to get her election.146 Governer Duekmejian had cause to be displeased with the Chief 
Justice. It was he who drafted the 1977 ammendment to the Penal Code, which brought back capital 
punishment. Further, if Rose Bird were defeated at the polls , and he retained the Governorship, it 
would be his task to appoint a new Chief Justice. Indeed upon the alienation of Rose Bird, Governer 
Deukmejian appointed Malcolm Lucas to the helm, 147 a judge he had previously appointed Supreme 
Court in 1984.148 
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The writer has attempted to explain how our judges are appointed. It cannot be stressed enough, how 
strongly reliant the system is upon the integrity of those in the positions of power. One shudders to 
think what may happen if the potential for abuse became a reality. But, then how would one know 
given the strong measure of judicial independence which acts as a cloak to all and sundry. 
The paper has outlined why a government may want to appoint someone with homogenous ideologies. 
For instance, someone who shares the same views as to economic policy, race relations or on 
penalties for violent crime or crime generally. The writer has also identified how the purported 
abuse may occur. The Attorney General is a political beast despite the rhetoric. The position whilst it 
is held by a politician will be the potential conduit for partisan patronage. Further, it is spurious to 
say the Attorney General, by being a politician is accountable for his appointments to the public . The 
suggestion is untenable given the lack of information as to how he exercises that function. Moreover, 
how many people know it is the Attorney General and not Minister of Justice who makes the 
appointment. The writer after speaking with different Justice Department officials was under the 
impression, appointments were made by the Minister of Justice. However, as later discovered and 
expressed in the paper, the appointment is made by the Attorney General. The two functions are 
distinct, but are often held by the same person . The point highlights the uncertainty as to how the 
process really works. 
As a pointed broadside, the writer hopes the new Attorney General the Rt Hon David Lange, will take 
the time to spell out how decisions are made, with the view to inspiring future confidence in the 
procedure. It is simply not acceptable to aver, because there are no public criticisms the process is 
generally accepted. As the writer has shown, there is much that needs to be discussed and fears which 
need to be abated, before we the public and future players in the system can say, we accept. 
Reform of any system can take one of two roads. The pragmatic road or ideal approach. The writer 
has chosen pragmatism. Given the size of our nation, we really only need slight administrative 
changes to negate many of the potential problems raised by this paper. Further, despite the notions 
of democracy the American election system appears to promote, the writer submits their system is 
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not an ideal model. Its adoption in New Zealand would require too many modifications. 
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